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GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 This appeal requires that we determine how the Medical 
Devices Amendments of 1976 which amended the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 360-360rr, allocates authority 
between the states and the Food and Drug Administration.  To be 
precise, we must decide whether 21 U.S.C. § 360k pre-empts Nina 
Michael's state law causes of action for negligent manufacture 
and design, strict product liability, breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability, breach of an express warranty, and 
common law fraud against Shiley Inc., the manufacturer of the 
Bjork-Shiley Heart Valve.   
 Applying the express pre-emption analysis defined by 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), we 
conclude that § 360k pre-empts Michael's cause of action for 
negligence (both manufacturing and design), strict product 
  
liability, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  
We also hold that Michael's complaint to the extent that it 
relies on fraud perpetrated by Shiley on the FDA is pre-empted.  
Finally, we hold that § 360k does not preclude Michael from 
pursuing common law causes of action for express warranty and for 
fraud to the extent that the fraud arises from Shiley's efforts 
to promote its product through letters to doctors and 
advertisements in medical journals.   
 Accordingly, while we will affirm the district court's pre-
emption rulings as to Michael's negligence, strict product 
liability, and implied warranty claims, we will reverse the 
district court's summary judgment to the extent that it entered 
judgment against Michael on her express warranty and fraud 
claims. 
 
 I 
 A. 
 Nina Michael's claims arise from the discovery in the past 
fifteen years that the outlet strut of the Bjork-Shiley 60 Degree 
Convexo-Concave Disc Heart Valve ("Shiley valve"), which was 
designed and manufactured by Shiley Inc., fractures in 
approximately one percent of the patients who received a Shiley 
implant.  App. 200.  These failures result from a weak strut 
mechanism and from poor manufacturing standards at Shiley's 
facilities.  A strut failure leads inevitably to death or serious 
injury. 
 
  
 B. 
 The Shiley valve was one of the first medical devices to be 
approved under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food 
Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (the "MDA"), a comprehensive 
extension of the FDA's authority beyond medical drug 
manufacturers to medical device manufacturers.  Pub. L. No. 94-
295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).  Congress passed the Amendments in 
response to the harm caused by the Dalkon Shield, an unregulated 
medical device which resulted in serious injury to a large number 
of women.1  Sen. Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 reprinted 
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1070, 1071.  Through the 
MDA, Congress hoped "to assure the reasonable safety and 
effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use."  H. 
Conf. Rep. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 reprinted in 1976 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1103, 1103.  To do so, it granted 
the FDA new broad powers to regulate medical devices, which 
powers are based on three statutory classifications.   
 Class I devices, such as tongue depressors, are devices 
which generally pose little or no threat to public health and are 
subject only to general controls on manufacturing.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(1)(A).  Class II devices, such as oxygen masks, pose a 
slightly greater risk of injury to patients, and accordingly, the 
MDA subjects them to performance standards, post market 
                     
1
.  For a history of the harm which resulted from the Dalkon 
Shield, see In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 710-12 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Anderson v. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989). 
  
surveillance, guidelines for use and other appropriate controls.  
See id § 360c(a)(1)(B).  Class III devices, such as the Shiley 
valve, include all devices which are to be implanted into people, 
which are used to sustain life, or which pose a potentially 
unreasonable risk of injury.  See id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).   
 Class III devices may not be marketed or sold until the 
sponsoring company obtains Premarket Approval (PMA) from the FDA.  
Id. § 360e.  To obtain a PMA, the sponsor must submit "all 
information, published or known to or which should reasonably be 
known to the applicant, concerning investigations which have been 
made to show whether or not such device is safe and effective," 
id. § 360e(c)(1)(A), a statement of the intended use of the 
product, a description of the expected manufacturing processes 
for the device, and any other information requested by the FDA.  
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(B)-(G).  After review by a panel of medical 
experts, the FDA may approve the PMA. 
 The FDA retains continuing oversight over approved Class III 
devices.  It requires manufacturers to report any deaths or 
serious injuries which result from the use of the product.  See 
21 C.F.R. § 803.24(c).  It may require warning or instructions on 
the labels which accompany the product.  21 C.F.R. § 814.82.  
Finally, the FDA regulates the manufacture of the devices through 
the imposition of good manufacturing processes.  21 C.F.R. 
§ 820.100-820.101.  The only remedial power granted to the FDA is 
the power to require the sponsor of the product to notify the 
public of a newly discovered danger posed by the product, order 
the company to replace the device, or order the company to refund 
  
the purchase price to the patient.  The FDA can take these 
actions only if it determines that the device presents an 
unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 360h(a).  The act does not permit the FDA to require companies 
to compensate victims for their medical expenses or for the pain 
and suffering resulting from a device failure. 
 
 C. 
 Shortly after the passage of the MDA, Shiley applied for 
Premarket Approval (PMA) to market the Shiley valve.  At the 
time, the FDA's procedures for PMA applications had not been 
finalized, see 51 Fed. Reg. 26364 (July 22, 1986) (defining PMA 
procedures), and thus the Shiley application did not receive the 
same organized and comprehensive evaluation that might be 
expected today.  Sen. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess., The Bjork-Shiley Valve: Earn as You Learn 20-22 (Comm. 
Print 1990) [hereinafter Energy & Commerce Report].  For example, 
evidence of the first strut fracture was belatedly brought to the 
FDA's attention and explained as an "isolated incident" even 
though it was unexplained at the time of the application.  Id. at 
21.  Further, Shiley made claims, based on unsubstantiated data, 
that reduced heart complications would result from Shiley valve 
implants.2  Id. at 22-24.  Despite these deficiencies, the FDA 
                     
2
.  Specifically, Shiley claimed a reduction in the rate of 
thromboembolism, the development of potentially dangerous blood 
clots at the valve's location.  The FDA later determined that 
there was no improvement in the rates of thromboembolism with the 
new valve and that this information, if known at the time the PMA 
  
approved the PMA on April 27, 1979, without a recorded vote.  Id. 
at 22. 
 Between 1979 and 1983, the struts which hold the mechanical 
valves in place in 73 Shiley valves fractured, id at 28, leading 
to the death of most of the implanted individuals.  These 
fractures were the result of both the valve's design and poor 
manufacturing processes.  In particular, the valves suffered from 
poor welding and poor quality control.  See id. at 5-14; App. 
461, 615-16, 623-25.  During this period, Shiley sent a set of 
letters to doctors and to the FDA reassuring them that these 
incidents did not compromise the integrity, safety, or 
effectiveness of the device.  Energy & Commerce Report at 14-17.  
Despite a redesign of the manufacturing process, continuing strut 
fractures forced Shiley to recall those valves which had not been 
implanted in 1980, 1982, and 1983.  Because of continuing 
problems with valve failures, Shiley recalled its larger size 
valves and ceased production of those sizes in October 1985.  
Finally, on November 24, 1986, Shiley withdrew all its remaining 
valves from the market and ceased production of any heart valves.  
On March 21, 1990, Shiley asked the FDA to withdraw its Premarket 
Approval.  To date, approximately 501 Shiley valves have 
fractured, resulting in 347 deaths.  App. 691. 
 
 D. 
(..continued) 
was filed, would likely have prevented FDA approval.  App. 766-
68. 
  
 These events first affected Nina Michael in 1981.  In that 
year, Michael was diagnosed with a congenital defect with her 
mitral heart valve, which controls of the flow of blood between 
the left atrium and the left ventricle.  Because the defect was 
potentially fatal, Michael underwent surgery to have her natural 
heart valve replaced with the Shiley valve on November 24, 1982.  
 The surgery was successful and the valve functioned 
properly.  The valve implanted in Michael came with the following 
disclosure under the heading "Disclaimer of Warranties": 
 Shiley warrants that reasonable care has been used in 
the manufacture of this device.  This warranty is 
exclusive and in lieu of all other warranties, whether 
express, implied, written or oral.  
App. 680.   
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Michael became aware of 
the strut fracture problem through media sources and her doctor.  
Research disclosed that her class of valves was among the Shiley 
valves with the highest rate of failure.  It was estimated that 
there was a two percent chance per year that a catastrophic valve 
failure would occur in the Shiley valve implanted in Michael.  
These disclosures caused Michael significant anxiety, which 
resulted in sleeplessness and other emotional and physical 
symptoms. 
 After consultations with her physicians, Michael had the 
Shiley valve surgically removed and replaced with a different 
valve in June 1992.  The surgeon visually examined her explanted 
  
valve and found no visible defects.  The valve was later 
discarded. 
 In March 1993, Michael filed a complaint in the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas, alleging state law claims of negligence, 
strict product liability, breach of implied warranties, breach of 
express warranties, and fraud.  App. 10-29.  Her complaint named 
Shiley Inc., the maker of the Shiley valve; Pfizer Inc., Shiley's 
corporate parent; and Hospital Products Group Inc., another 
corporate owner of Shiley.  Shiley removed the case to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction.  App. 31.  On August 16, 1993, Shiley filed two 
summary judgment motions.  One motion alleged that all claims 
except the express warranty claim were pre-empted.  The second 
motion alleged that Michael had failed to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact to support her claims.   
 Through orders dated February 25, 1994, March 31, 1994, and 
April 7, 1994, the district court granted judgment on all the 
claims against Michael and in favor of Shiley.  It granted 
judgment on the negligence, strict product liability, and implied 
warranty claims on both pre-emption and traditional Rule 56 
grounds.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  It granted judgment on the 
express warranty claim for failure to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Finally, it granted judgment on the fraud claim 
solely because it was pre-empted. 
 Michael filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
 II. 
  
 We exercise plenary review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and apply the same test that the district court 
should have applied initially.  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 
(1977).  Thus, we will affirm only if Michael has failed to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact and Shiley is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  In examining the record, we 
give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences 
from the record.  Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 
1078 (3d Cir. 1992).  We exercise plenary review over the 
district court's pre-emption determination, as it is a question 
of law.  Travitz v. Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 
13 F.3d 704, 708 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2165 (1994).  
We also exercise plenary review over the district court's 
application of state law.  Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 
U.S. 225, 231 (1991). 
 
 III 
 A. 
 The parties' core dispute is whether, or to what extent, the 
MDA pre-empts Michael's state common law causes of action.  
Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the 
United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding."  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  By virtue of this 
grant of federal power, Congress can through a sufficiently clear 
expression of its intent displace state law.  Cipollone v. 
  
Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992);3 CSX Transp. 
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993) ("[P]re-emption 
will not lie unless it is `the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.'") (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)).  "In the interest of avoiding unintended 
encroachment on the authority of the States, however, a court 
interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject 
traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find 
pre-emption."  CSX Transp. Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 Pre-emption may arise explicitly from the statute's language 
or implicitly from the statute's structure and purpose.  Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2036 (1992).  
Nonetheless, "[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of pre-
emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision 
explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision 
provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect 
to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional 
intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of 
legislation."  Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (quotations and 
citations omitted).   
                     
3
.  We recognize that Cipollone was decided by a plurality of the 
Supreme Court.  We are satisfied that the pre-emption discussion 
and holding represents the Court's current pre-emption analysis.  
See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 1995 WL 15047 (U.S. 
1995); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 
1994); Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993). 
  
 Because Shiley relies upon the express pre-emptive scope of 
21 U.S.C. § 360k, our task is primarily one of statutory 
construction.  Id.  at 2621.  We must give the language of § 360k 
"a fair but narrow reading" which will give effect to Congress' 
purpose without undermining "the strong presumption against pre-
emption."  Id.   
 Cipollone illustrates the manner in which we are to apply 
these doctrines.  In Cipollone, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 or the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 pre-empted Rose 
Cipollone's state common law causes of action for failure to 
warn, breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and conspiracy claims.  The Court concluded that the limited 
language of the 1965 act did not prevent a state claimant from 
recovering damages in a state common law cause of action not 
otherwise pre-empted.  112 S. Ct. at 2619. 
 The Court turned to the broader pre-emption provision of the 
1965 Act which stated "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on 
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect 
to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes . . . ."  Id. at 
2617.  Applying a "fair but narrow" reading of this provision, 
the Court held that Cipollone could not maintain a failure to 
warn claim because the statute prevented states from requiring 
any warning beyond the federally mandated statement "CAUTION: 
CIGARETTE SMOKING IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH."  Id. at 2621-22.  
In contrast, the Court concluded that Cipollone's express 
warranty and fraud claims could proceed.  The contract claim was 
  
not "imposed under State law" and the fraud claim did not impose 
a requirement "with respect to the advertising or promotion of 
cigarettes."  Id. at 2622-24. 
 
 B. 
 Statutory interpretation begins with an analysis of the 
statute's language.  Section 360k(a) provides: 
  Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, no State or political subdivision of a State 
may establish or continue in effect with respect to a 
device intended for human use any requirement -- 
 
   (1) which is different from, or in addition 
to, any requirement applicable under this chapter 
to the device, and  
 
   (2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device 
under this chapter. 
 
This section pre-empts only state imposed requirements.  Further, 
it pre-empts those requirements only when they differ from or add 
to a previously established FDA requirement and relate to the 
safety or efficacy of the regulated device.  When a state law 
differs from or adds to a FDA requirement and when a state law 
relates to the safety or effectiveness of a device approved by 
the FDA, the state law is pre-empted.  Conversely, when a state 
law neither imposes requirements nor differs from or adds to a 
FDA requirement nor relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device or to any other matter included in a FDA requirement, the 
state law is not pre-empted by § 360k. 
 
  
 C. 
 We first consider Michael's two threshold arguments:  (1) 
that state common law does not impose "requirements" and (2) that 
the FDA imposed no "requirements" on Shiley.  Either would 
prevent the MDA from pre-empting any of her claims.   
 An extended discussion of whether the state common law 
imposes requirements under the MDA is unnecessary.4  We have 
already determined that the term "requirements" as used in § 360k 
encompasses state common law claims.  Gile v. Optical Radiation 
Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541-42 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 
(1994).  In Gile, we followed the Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of the term "requirement" as used in § 5(b) of the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.  There the Court 
"reject[ed Cipollone's] argument that the phrase `requirement or 
                     
4
.  Michael points in particular to the FDA regulations which 
interpret § 360k.  See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1.  21 C.F.R. 
§ 808.1(d)(1) states: 
 
  [Section 360k(a)] does not preempt State or local 
requirements of general applicability where the purpose 
of the requirement relates either to other products in 
addition to devices (e.g. requirements such as general 
electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code 
(warranty of fitness)), or to unfair trade practices in 
which the requirements are not limited to devices. 
 
Despite the reference in 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) to laws of 
general applicability, we hold that the statutory language of 
§ 360k preempts Michael's claims for breach of the implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness as explained in section 
IV. A. infra. 
 
 We express no view on the validity of § 808.1(d)(1) 
because Shiley disclaimed all implied warranties as it was 
entitled to do under the Code. 
  
prohibition' limits the 1969 Act's pre-emptive scope to positive 
enactments by legislatures and agencies."  Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2620. 
 
 D. 
 Michael next argues that, while we could normally conclude 
that the FDA had imposed requirements on a manufacturer, the 
unique facts of this case preclude such a determination.  
Michael's argument is based on failings in the Premarket Approval 
and oversight process which arose because Shiley's heart valve 
was among the first mechanical devices approved under the MDA.  
According to Michael, these failings kept the FDA from imposing 
any requirements on Shiley.   
 Michael claims that the lack of FDA requirements is proved 
by the absence of any specific regulations which govern heart 
valves as compared with the other medical devices.  Cf. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 813.1 - 813.170 (regulating the testing and manufacture of 
intraocular lenses); 21 C.F.R. § 870.1025 - 870.5925 (classifying 
and imposing requirements on various cardiovascular devices).  To 
support this claim, Michael points to the FDA's statement that 
the MDA pre-empts state requirements only when the FDA "has 
established specific counterpart regulations or there are other 
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the 
act . . . ."  21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). 
 The absence of regulations relating specifically to heart 
valves is not dispositive as long as the Shiley valve was subject 
to "any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device."  
  
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1).  While Shiley's premarket application may 
indeed have been flawed, there is ample evidence that the Shiley 
valve was subject to requirements under the MDA.  First, it is 
clear that Shiley had to and did obtain a PMA prior to marketing 
the device.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360e.  After Premarket Approval was 
obtained, Shiley was subject to the labeling requirements of 21 
C.F.R. § 801.1 - 801.16, which became effective February 13, 
1976, and of 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 - 820.198, which defined the 
general "good manufacturing practices" ("GMP") required of 
medical device manufacturers after July 21, 1978.  See 41 Fed. 
Reg. 6896 (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 31508 (1978).  The FDA had the 
power to force notification of a previously unknown risk under 21 
U.S.C. § 360h(a)5 and at least once threatened to use this power.  
                     
5
.  21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) reads in relevant part as follows: 
 
 (a) Notification 
 
 If the Secretary determines that-- 
 
  (1) a device intended for human use which is 
introduced or delivered for introduction into 
interstate commerce for commercial distribution 
presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to 
the public health, and 
 
  (2) notification under this subsection is 
necessary to eliminate the unreasonable risk of such 
harm and no more practicable means is available under 
the provisions of this chapter (other than this 
section) to eliminate such risk,  
 
 the Secretary may issue such order as may be necessary 
to assure that adequate notification is provided in an 
appropriate form, by the persons and means best suited 
under the circumstances involved, to all health 
professionals who prescribe or use the device and to 
any other person (including manufacturer, importers, 
distributors, retailers, and device users) who should 
  
See app. 766-69.  Even though these generally applicable 
regulations do not rise to the level of specificity present in 
the case of some other devices regulated by the FDA, we conclude 
that they present "specific requirements applicable to a 
particular device under the act."  21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).  They 
therefore constitute proper bases for pre-emption under § 360k. 
 
 IV 
 Having disposed of Michael's general allegations, we 
consider whether § 360k pre-empts the separate theories of 
recovery that Michael alleges.  See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 
(considering each of Cipollone's theories of recovery to 
determine if they are pre-empted).  Because Gile has already 
determined that state law negligence and strict product liability 
claims are pre-empted under § 360k on account of the potential 
conflict with FDA labeling, design, and manufacturing 
requirements, we will not discuss those claims further than to 
restate that they are pre-empted.  See Gile, 22 F.3d at 543-44. 
 
(..continued) 
properly receive such notification in order to 
eliminate such risk. 
  
 A. 
 Breach of Implied Warranties -- Pre-empted 
 Michael brings a claim for breach of the implied warranties 
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.  13 
Penn. Con. Stat. Ann. §§ 2314, 2315.  These Uniform Commercial 
Code causes of action meet the first requirement of pre-emption 
under § 360k; they are state imposed.  They "arise by operation 
of law" in any transaction in goods in Pennsylvania.  Altronics 
of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1105 (3d Cir. 
1992).   The requirements imposed by §§ 2314 and 2315 also 
potentially differ from or exceed the FDA's requirements.  To 
decide Michael's implied warranty claims, the jury would have to 
decide whether the Shiley valve was defective.  Id.; see also 13 
Penn. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2314 (Goods must be "fit for the 
ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.").  In Michael's 
case, this determination would require a finding that the heart 
valve's design was flawed, unreasonably dangerous, or poorly 
manufactured.  Id.   
 This conclusion by necessity depends upon the accepted 
standards for the design and manufacture of products in the state 
of Pennsylvania.  These standards may deviate from the FDA's 
determinations in the PMA process or from the FDA's "good 
manufacturing practices," which represent the agency's expert 
evaluation regarding the design and production of the Shiley 
valve.  Section 360k does not permit this conflict.  Accord King 
v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 84 (1993). 
  
 
 B. 
 Express Warranty Based on Shiley's Label -- Not Pre-empted 
 Michael also brought an express warranty claim based on 
Shiley's statement on its packaging that it "warrants that 
reasonable care has been used in the manufacture of this device."  
App. 680.   
 Before we address this issue, we must consider, as a 
threshold issue, whether the district court ruled that this claim 
was pre-empted.  The district court's February 25, 1994 order 
granted Shiley's motion for partial summary judgment based on 
pre-emption.  Shiley's motion had sought the entry of summary 
judgment on Michael's claims of negligence, strict product 
liability, breach of implied warranties, and fraud claims, but 
not on Michael's breach of express warranty claim.  App. 48.  
However, in ruling on Shiley' motion, the district court stated, 
"[w]e have held that the MDA has wholly pre-empted plaintiff's 
state law claims against defendants."  App. 1362.  On appeal, 
Shiley has argued that we can reach the question of pre-emption 
because the district court granted summary judgment on Michael's 
express warranty claim for failure to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact and we can affirm on any appropriate ground.  
Shiley's Br. at 28.  Because "[t]he prevailing party may, of 
course, assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of his 
judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even 
considered by the trial court," we will address that issue.  
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970). 
  
 Section 360k only pre-empts requirements which the state 
"establish[es]" or "continue[s] in force."  The focus of § 360k 
is on preventing the States from imposing on medical device 
manufacturers normative policy choices which conflict with FDA 
requirements.  See Gile, 22 F.3d at 546.  This focus is 
consistent with the limited purpose for which Congress displaced 
the states' coordinate regulatory role -- to permit efficient and 
effective FDA regulation of medical devices.  The FDA itself has 
recognized the MDA's limited focus by interpreting § 360k to pre-
empt only state requirements "having the force and effect of 
law," a term normally reserved for binding standards of conduct 
that operate irrespective of private agreement.  21 C.F.R. 
§ 808.1(d). 
 
 1. 
 Express warranties arise from the representations of the 
parties which are made the basis of the bargain and do not result 
from the independent operation of state law.  See 13 Penn. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 2313.  Implied warranties, on the other hand, "arise 
by operation of [state] law."  Altronics of Bethlehem v. Repco, 
Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1105 (3d Cir. 1992).  The parties to a 
contract, not the state, define the substantive obligations of 
the contract and hence any express warranties.  While the state 
provides for the enforcement of the parties' bargain, it does not 
define each party's duties.6   
                     
6
.  The conceptual difficulty with determining whether, to what 
extent, and for what purposes contractual obligations arise by 
  
 The underlying foundation of contract law is the objectively 
manifested intentions of the parties.  E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Contracts §§ 1.1 - 1.3 (2d ed. 1990).  Shiley, in the 
representation which appears on the Shiley valve label, clearly 
manifested an intent to be bound by its one unequivocal promise 
and to disclaim any other implied warranties.  Shiley 
represented:  
 Shiley warrants that reasonable care has been used in 
the manufacture of this device.  This warranty is 
exclusive and in lieu of all other warranties, whether 
express, implied, written or oral. 
App. 680. 
 
 2. 
 The Supreme Court has twice recognized this same distinction 
between state-imposed and state-enforced common law remedies.  In 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 1995 WL 15047 (U.S. 1995), the 
(..continued) 
virtue of state action, on the one hand, or the autonomous 
actions of the parties, on the other, has been addressed time and 
again in the literature on the common law.  See, e.g., Jay M 
Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology in The Politics 
of Law 373, 378 (David Kairys ed. 1990); Charles Fried, Contract 
as Promise 7-27 (1981).  Ultimately, contractual obligations 
result from the confluence of state authority and private 
actions.  While the "binding force" of a properly executed 
contract derives from state authority, the content of the 
commitment is determined (absent mandatory or impermissible 
terms) by the parties themselves.  In this way, contractual 
obligations differ fundamentally from state imposed regulatory 
requirements, such as the FDA requirement that medical devices 
meet certain design parameters.  Both the content and the effect 
of these regulations flow from governmental authority. 
  
Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1305(a)(1), did not preempt Wolen's common law contract claims, 
writing: 
 We do not read the ADA's preemption clause, however, to 
shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of 
state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely 
for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-
imposed undertakings.  As persuasively argued by the 
United States, terms and conditions airlines offer and 
passengers accept are privately ordered obligations 
"and thus do not amount to a state's enact[ment] or 
enforce[ment] [of] any law rule, regulation, standard, 
or other provision having the force and effect of law' 
within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1)."  Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae 9. . . . A remedy 
confined to a contract's terms simply holds the parties 
to their agreements -- in this instance to business 
judgments an airline made public about its rates and 
services. 
1995 WL 15047 at *6. 
 Previously, in Cipollone, the Court concluded that § 5(b) of 
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not pre-empt 
state contract law claims. 
 A manufacturer's liability for breach of an 
express warranty derives from, and is measured by, the 
terms of that warranty.  Accordingly, the 
"requirements" imposed by an express warranty claim are 
not "imposed under State law," but rather imposed by 
the warrantor. . . . In short, a common law remedy for 
a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken should 
not be regarded as a "requirement . . . imposed under 
State law" within the meaning of § 5(b). 
 
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2622 (emphasis in original).   
 Moreover, our conclusion complies with the Supreme Court's 
admonition that courts should be "reluctant" to find pre-emption 
when "interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject 
traditionally governed by state law."  CSX Trans. Inc. v. 
  
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993).  This is especially 
true here where Congress remained silent as to whether the MDA 
pre-empted common law contract claims.  The elimination of those 
claims might result in the elimination of all legal remedies to 
the purchaser.  "It is difficult to believe that Congress would, 
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those 
injured by illegal conduct."  Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 
U.S. 238, 251 (1984).   
 In this case, Congress has not only remained silent as to 
whether it intended to prevent states from enforcing the 
contractual representations of medical device manufacturers, it 
gave indications in 21 U.S.C. § 360h that at least some common 
law remedies would remain in conjunction with FDA regulation.  
Section 360h(d) defines the effect that a manufacturer's 
compliance with an FDA notification, reimbursement, or recall 
order should have: 
  Compliance with an order issued under this section 
shall not relieve any person of liability under Federal 
or State law.  In awarding damages for economic loss in 
an action brought for the enforcement of any such 
liability, the value to the plaintiff in such action of 
any remedy provided him under such order shall be taken 
into account. 
 
While this provision does not delineate the scope of the state 
law remedies that remain after the MDA's passage, it contemplates 
that injured persons will be able to pursue a category of claims 
for economic loss under some circumstances.  We conclude that 
express warranty claims are included in that category.   
 
  
 3. 
 Shiley points to previous cases that have concluded that the 
same or similar federal regulatory schemes do pre-empt contract 
claims because the contract claims conflict with the FDA's 
supervision over medical device labeling.  Worm v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1993)7; King v. Collagen 
Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 
(1993)8; Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mich. 
1994).9   These courts have held that pre-emption was appropriate 
because the state law causes of action arose from representations 
made by manufacturers on labels approved by the FDA or EPA.  The 
courts reasoned that because these labels were approved by the 
relevant regulatory authority, they could not give rise to 
voluntary obligations undertaken by agreement and so would 
conflict with federal regulation. 
                     
7
.  In Worm v. Cyanamid Co, the Fourth Circuit decided that the 
pre-emption provision of the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), pre-empted the 
plaintiff's contract claims because the claims were based on 
instructions for use found on the product label which were 
required and approved by EPA regulations.  5 F.3d at 749.  
Because the Fourth Circuit found that these instructions were 
mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency, the court 
concluded that the express warranty claims were pre-empted.  Id. 
8
.  In King v. Collagen Corp., the First Circuit concluded that 
§ 360k pre-empted King's express warranty claims because those 
claims arose from the language on the packaging approved by the 
FDA.  983 F.2d at 1135.  "Allowing appellant's express warranty 
claims effectively would impose additional or different 
requirements on Zyderm's labeling and packaging."  Id. 
9
.  In Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., the district court followed the 
reasoning of King and Worm to hold that § 360k  pre-empted a 
contract claim against Pfizer, Hospital Products Group, and 
Shiley, the defendants in this case. 
  
 If for no other reason, Worm is distinguishable from this 
case because it deals with a separate statutory scheme.  Worm 
dealt with Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), not the MDA.  Second, the plaintiff in Worm complained 
that Cyanamid had provided improper instructions for the use of 
the insecticide on its label, giving rise to a contract claim.  5 
F.3d at 748-49.  Michael is not challenging the instructions for 
the use or the implantation of the Shiley valve.  Rather she 
seeks to enforce the company's explicit warranty which guarantees 
the product. 
 King and Kemp are less easily distinguished.  The court in 
King did not indicate the type of language or warning upon which 
the plaintiff relied in the case before it and so we cannot know 
if it is distinguishable from Michael's claims.  Kemp dealt with 
the same product and the same warranty as is at issue in the 
present case. 
 Neither King nor Kemp are binding on this court and we 
conclude that the concern expressed in those cases, that warranty 
obligations would arise from and therefore be in conflict with 
statements that are required on a regulated label, does not make 
pre-emption appropriate.  First, the fact that third parties 
dictate or define the terms of a contract does not undermine the 
doctrine that contractual duties arise from the mutual assent of 
parties to agreed upon language.  For example, organizations that 
receive government grants to operate social programs frequently 
agree to include specified language in agreements with 
contractors and beneficiaries.  See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 85.36(i) 
  
(1994) (mandating the inclusion of specified terms in contracts 
between Housing and Urban Development grant recipients and local 
parties); Ayers v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 908 F.2d 1184 
(3d Cir. 1990) (discussing HUD mandates for contracts between the 
local housing authority and the local authority's 
tenants/purchasers).  Government contractors must agree to 
specified compensation and wage terms in their contracts with 
employees who work on the government projects.  See, e.g., 40 
U.S.C. §§ 328-29, 323; 41 U.S.C. § 351; 29 C.F.R. §§ 4.1 to 4.51; 
29 C.F.R § 5.5.  Courts do not thereby conclude that these 
requirements cause the immediate parties' contractual 
relationships to arise from the federal mandate.  Regardless of 
the economic and legal pressures that dictate the final terms, 
the contract still results from the parties' mutual agreement to 
those terms. 
 Further, King and Kemp did not adequately consider the 
extent to which Shiley's label was ultimately a product of its 
voluntary actions.  The FDA does not devise a label of its own 
making.  Rather, Shiley submitted its proposed label to the FDA, 
which label was then reviewed with the company.  Shiley itself 
drafted the initial language of the label.  If Shiley disagreed 
with FDA recommendations, it could have engaged in negotiation 
over what statement was proper or, if it did not wish to be bound 
by the required statement, it could have chosen not to market its 
device.  Despite indications in King and Kemp to the contrary, we 
believe that Shiley participated actively and meaningfully in the 
  
FDA regulatory process that resulted in the label which we review 
here. 
 
 4. 
 Even if this were not the case, the enforcement of an 
express warranty that arises from approved packaging does not 
establish a requirement that "is different from, or in addition 
to, . . . any requirement applicable under this chapter to the 
device."  21 U.S.C. § 360k.  Through her express warranty claim, 
Michael seeks to enforce the very language which the FDA approved 
on the Shiley valve label.  Given the clarity with which that 
language speaks of warranties, neither the FDA, Shiley, nor 
Michael could have mistaken this language as creating anything 
other than an explicit contractual obligation.  Thus, it is the 
FDA's own requirement that Michael would have the state enforce.  
  If any person, other than Shiley, "established" the 
warranty, it was the FDA, not the state.  Because the obligations 
imposed arise directly from the FDA's own approved language, the 
resulting liability does not differ from or add to FDA 
regulation.  Rather it supports the FDA's approval regulation by 
giving it effect.   
 Michael's contract claim is not a product of state action; 
hence, it is not state imposed -- the sine qua non of pre-emption 
under § 360k.  Michael's express warranty claim is not pre-empted 
and can be prosecuted.  
 
 V 
  
 Michael also brought fraud claims relying on two theories of 
recovery.  First, she alleges that Shiley fraudulently misled the 
FDA to her eventual, but foreseeable, detriment.  Second, she 
alleges that Shiley's unregulated promotional and advertising 
materials fraudulently misrepresented that the Shiley valve was 
safe and would produce fewer complications than other valves when 
the company knew that these claims were not supportable.  We 
consider whether § 360k pre-empts each of these claims. 
 
 A. 
 Fraud on the FDA -- Pre-empted 
 Michael produced substantial evidence that Shiley misled the 
FDA with false or misleading information when it applied for 
Premarket Approval.  She claims that these fraudulent submissions 
led to the FDA's approval of the Shiley valve and thus led 
eventually to the necessity of removing the heart valve implanted 
in her.  Alternatively, she argues that these fraudulent 
submissions estop Shiley from claiming that the MDA pre-empts its 
common law claims.  Because of the conflict with the FDA's own 
efforts to monitor and control its PMA application process, we 
conclude that Michael's claims for Shiley's knowing 
misrepresentation to the FDA, even if provable, are pre-empted. 
 A state law cause of action for fraud is a state imposed 
requirement.  By means of its recognized cause of action in 
fraud, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania imposes a duty on anyone 
who sells products.  That duty requires the seller to avoid any 
  
material misrepresentation that could induce purchasers to buy 
its product.  See Moser v. DeSetta, 589 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. 1991) 
 Michael seeks to use this general prohibition on deception 
to encourage the district court to review the PMA application 
Shiley submitted to the FDA.  This inquiry could ultimately 
require that a court determine whether the information Shiley 
submitted was truthful, whether it was complete, whether FDA 
procedures sufficed to avoid a material misrepresentation, and 
whether the FDA should have or would have approved the device 
despite the misrepresentations.  In sum, this claim requires a 
court, applying state law, to perform the same functions 
initially entrusted to the FDA. 
 Section 360k does not permit such a searching state inquiry 
into the inner workings of FDA procedures.  Congress allocated 
the FDA responsibility to design and manage a process which would 
result in approval of the safest and most effective medical 
devices possible.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (creating the PMA 
requirement).  Congress also assigned the FDA the responsibility 
to approve or disapprove of applications to market medical 
devices.  Under § 360k, states may not impose different 
requirements and thereby reach a different conclusion than the 
FDA.  "[W]here the FDA was authorized to render the expert 
decision . . ., it, and not some jury or judge, is best suited to 
determine the factual issues and what their effect could have 
been on its original conclusions."  King, 983 F.2d at 1140 
(Aldrich & Campbell, J.J. concurring).  Under the MDA, states 
have no authority to police Shiley's compliance with the FDA's 
  
procedures.  If Shiley knowingly misled the FDA in its PMA 
application, it is for the FDA to remedy that situation using the 
authority Congress gave it in the MDA. 
 Further, permitting a fraud claim based on false 
representations to the FDA would conflict with our precedent that 
plaintiffs may not bring implied causes of action for violations 
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.  Gile v. Optical Radiation 
Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 
(1994).  Plaintiffs cannot circumvent this bar by characterizing 
their cause as a claim for state law fraud. 
 Nor can Michael revive the pre-empted fraud claim by 
characterizing it as a defense to pre-emption.  Michael argues 
that, though her fraud claim might be pre-empted, her allegations 
of Shiley's fraud in obtaining its PMA, if proven, should deprive 
Shiley of the defense of pre-emption.  In essence, Michael argues 
that we should not permit Shiley to invoke the cloak of federal 
pre-emption when it obtained that cloak through the fraudulent 
manipulation of the regulatory process.   
 While we do not condone misconduct by medical device 
manufacturers, we cannot agree with Michael's theory.  If a 
medical device manufacturer's claim that the MDA pre-empts a 
plaintiff's cause of action depends in the first instance upon 
proof that its Premarket Approval was not fraudulently obtained, 
courts would have to engage in the intrusive inquiry, which we 
have just demonstrated is forbidden.  Only the timing, and not 
the inquiry itself, would differ from a claim for fraud on the 
FDA.  This argument thus presents not less, but greater 
  
interference with the FDA's decisions.  An attempt to reexamine 
the FDA's approval under state law standards, however pleaded, is 
pre-empted by § 360k. 
 
 B. 
 Fraud Based on Shiley's Advertisements -- Not Pre-empted 
 Michael's second fraud claim differs from the first in that 
it does not rely on conduct which was directly regulated by the 
FDA.  Michael alleges that Shiley sent cardiac surgeons and 
cardiologists a series of letters and other promotional materials 
which knowingly misrepresented the extent of the valve fracture 
problem and knowingly overstated the reduction in serious side 
effects achieved by the Shiley valve.  See FDA and the Medical 
Device Industry, Hearing Before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-21 (1990) (providing samples 
of these letters); App. 393-95.   Michael alleges that the 
company's misinformation resulted in the eventual harm she 
suffered when her valve was explanted. 
 
 1. 
 Having already concluded that state law fraud claims create 
state-imposed requirements and, when combined with other § 360k 
elements, are thus pre-empted, see section V. A. supra, we need 
only consider the other elements of pre-emption under § 360k.10  
                     
10
.  The Supreme Court recently held that the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA") pre-empted the enforcement of a 
state consumer fraud statute, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/2.  American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 
  
The FDA had not imposed specific requirements related to 
advertising and promotion of the Shiley valve.  Accordingly, we 
find that, as applied to Michael's circumstances, a state law 
fraud claim based on Shiley's advertising and promotional 
activities does not impose a requirement that "is different from, 
or in addition to" a FDA requirement and "which relates to the 
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any matter included 
in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter."  
21 U.S.C. § 360k. 
 Unlike Michael's strict liability claims which are based on 
a duty to produce safe products, Michael's fraud claims are based 
"on a more general obligation -- the duty not to deceive."  
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2624.  Thus, Michael's fraud claim does 
not relate to the safety or effectiveness of the Shiley valve.  
Michael argues that because this duty to avoid deceit does not 
"relate to the safety or effectiveness of the [Shiley valve]," 
her claims are not pre-empted.   
 She relies on Cipollone for this argument.  In Cipollone, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the Cipollone's fraud claims 
against cigarette manufacturers were only pre-empted to the 
(..continued) 
1995 WL 15047 *5-*6 (U.S. 1995).  In Wolens, the Supreme Court 
held that state consumer fraud statute was a state imposed law.  
Id.  The Court then found that the Illinois state statute met the 
other element of pre-emption under the ADA, that is, the statute 
"relate[d] to [airline] rates, routes, or services."  49 U.S.C. 
§ 1305(a)(1). 
 Here, of course, the other requirements which dictate 
pre-emption under § 360k of the MDA differ from the requirements 
which dictate pre-emption under § 1305(a)(2) of the ADA.  As 
stated in text, we conclude that Michael's common law fraud claim 
is not pre-empted by § 360k. 
  
extent they sought to impose additional warnings on the cigarette 
packages.  The Court permitted Cipollone's fraud claims for 
"claims based on allegedly false statements of material fact made 
in advertisements."  Id. at 2623-24.  The Court made this 
distinction because Cipollone's second claim based on "the duty 
not to deceive" did not conflict with federal requirements of § 5 
of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 which only 
pre-empts state law claims "based on smoking and health."  Id. at 
2624. 
 If § 360k also limited its pre-emptive scope to state 
requirements "which relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of 
the device," Michael's argument might be compelling, but § 360k 
is not so limited.  It extends as well to state requirements 
"which relate[] . . .  to any matter included in a requirement 
applicable to the device under this chapter."  Thus, we must 
determine not only whether Michael's fraud claim relates to 
"safety and effectiveness" -- which we hold it does not -- but 
also whether it relates to any other FDA requirement. 
 
 2. 
 This latter inquiry turns on whether the FDA imposed any 
requirements on Shiley's efforts to promote its heart valve.  The 
record reflects that it did not.  Shiley prepared and sent the 
letters which tout the valve's reliability and superiority as 
compared to competitors' valves to doctors without the FDA's 
approval.  App. 393-94.  The FDA, at that time, was not 
supervising medical device manufacturers' efforts to promote 
  
their devices outside of a limited category of "restricted 
devices" defined by the MDA and not relevant to this appeal.  
Only in the last few years has the FDA actively sought to control 
the promotional representations which device makers make to the 
medical community.  Sandra J.P. Dennis, Promotion of Devices: An 
Extension of FDA Drug Regulation or a New Frontier, 48 Food & 
Drug L.J. 87 (1993).  We note, however, that this on-going 
extension of the FDA's authority has been criticized as exceeding 
the FDA's statutory mandate.  See id; Jeffrey N. Gibbs, Medical 
Device Promotional Activities and Private Litigation, 47 Food & 
Drug L.J. 295 (1992). 
 To be sure, the FDA did regulate the information Shiley 
placed on its labels.  As required by the MDA, Shiley submitted 
its labels to the FDA and the FDA approved them.  (See section 
IV. B. supra).  A deviation from the content of the label 
approved by the FDA violates the MDA.  21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a)(2).  
Nonetheless, there is a substantial difference between 
supervising label content and supervising advertising. 
 Mindful that the Supreme Court has observed in a slightly 
different context that "Congress offered no sign that it wished 
to insulate . . . manufacturers from longstanding rules governing 
fraud," Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2624, we conclude that Michael's 
second theory of fraud is not precluded by § 360k and is thus not 
pre-empted. 
    Our conclusion does not conflict with First Circuit's 
determination in King that § 360k pre-empted King's fraud claim.  
983 F.2d at 1136.  King's fraud claim arose from the absence of 
  
warnings on the label of the medical device.  Id.  Because the 
FDA regulates the labeling of medical devices, King's claims were 
pre-empted.  Michael's theory does not depend upon Shiley's 
representations on its labeling.  Unlike in King where the court 
determined that the plaintiff's fraud claim was, "at bottom, a 
failure to warn claim," id., and thus pre-empted by the MDA, 
Michael's fraud claim is, at bottom, a fraudulent promotion 
claim.  As such, it is not pre-empted. 
 
 VI 
 Summary Judgment -- Sufficient Evidence 
 Although the district court granted summary judgment on the 
majority of Michael's claims because it believed they were pre-
empted, it also analyzed the claims using the traditional 
standard for summary judgment.  We have concluded that Michael's 
express warranty claim and her fraud claim are not pre-empted.  
However, our holding in this regard does not address the district 
court's ruling that Michael had failed to present sufficient 
evidence to proceed to trial.  We address that issue here and 
hold that, on this record, it was error to grant summary judgment 
for Shiley. 
 
 A. 
 Our consideration of Michael's contract claims originates 
with an examination of the contract.  The label attached to the 
heart valve, which was implanted in Michael, included the 
statement "Shiley warrants that reasonable care has been used in 
  
the manufacture of this device."  App. 680.  This language 
clearly created an express warranty with regard to the manner in 
which Shiley manufactured its heart valves.  Shiley does not deny 
that the sale created a valid contract with an express warranty.  
See 13 Pa. C.S.A. § 2313.  Rather Shiley contends that it never 
breached the warranty because there is no proof that the valve 
implanted in Michael was defective. 
 We agree that there is no evidence in the record that 
Michael's valve was defective.  That does not, however, defeat 
Michael's cause of action.  Shiley's warranty does not simply 
warrant that the valve which was implanted in Michael was defect-
free.  The language is less specific, warranting instead that 
"reasonable care has been taken in the manufacture of this 
device."  App. 680. 
 We are satisfied that the representation made by the 
language on this label reaches beyond the valve explanted from 
Michael to encompass the manufacture of Shiley valves generally.  
While most consumers of most products have little reason to seek 
assurances in a contract that any device, other than the product 
purchased by them, is safe and effective, heart valve purchasers, 
as perhaps other purchasers of implanted devices, have salient 
and compelling reasons to seek such assurances.   
 Shiley's customers rely on Shiley's mechanical heart valves 
in a manner that differs entirely from the normal buyer's 
reliance on a consumer product.  The Shiley valve sustains 
customer's lives.  Malfunction will result in serious harm, or 
most likely, death.  In this context, the purchaser has reason to 
  
demand a very high degree of assurance that the implanted product 
presents no substantial risk that it will fail.  The existence of 
a significant risk that the device will fail makes the product 
unsuitable for its purpose.  Therefore, a patient-purchaser has 
every reason to seek, and Shiley has every reason to give, 
assurances that reasonable care has been taken in the production 
of such life sustaining devices generally.  It is only such a 
warranty that can alleviate concerns that an implanted medical 
device will fail without warning. 
 Shiley's warranty afforded its patient-purchasers those 
assurances.  Michael proceeded with her implant operation with a 
justifiable belief that the valve implanted in her heart would 
not fracture or fail due to deficiencies in the manufacturing 
process.  Because any latent defect in an implanted device may be 
undetectable after it has entered medical supply channels, the 
representations made by the manufacturer, which here form the 
basis of Shiley's warranty, requires an examination, not just of 
the specific heart valve implanted in Michael, but rather of 
Shiley's valve production generally. 
 The evidence in the record suggests that Shiley did not 
exercise due care in the fabrication of the Bjork-Shiley valve.  
A number of Shiley valves failed as a result of welding cracks 
that were not prevented or eliminated at Shiley's factories.  
Michael also submitted to the court the findings of a House 
Committee report on the manufacture of Shiley's valves.  That 
report stated that Shiley trained welders inadequately, repaired 
valves which had previously been deemed not repairable by 
  
inspectors, and masked cracked welds to pass quality inspections.  
She also produced a letter to Shiley from a medical researcher, 
stating that "[y]our statement re. strut fracture that I just 
received only tells me that your manufacturing procedure is not 
acceptable."  App. 461.  Former welders stated in affidavits that 
Shiley trained welders poorly and told welders to force badly 
welded valves past quality control personnel.  App 615-16, App. 
623-25.  This record could amply support a jury determination 
that Shiley did not exercise reasonable care in the manufacture 
of its heart valves. 
 Michael has also shown that Shiley's alleged manufacturing 
breaches caused her damage.  Shiley's failure to manufacture its 
heart valves using proper care resulted in a risk that any of its 
heart valves could fail.  Indeed, the weak or improper strut 
construction has resulted in over 500 documented strut failures.  
Nor, as we have pointed out, could it be determined without 
explantation whether the valve implanted in Michael suffered from 
any of the same defects that affected other valves.  Accordingly, 
Michael's doctors concluded that it was reasonable to explant her 
Shiley valve and replace it surgically.  App. 499-501, 526-29; 
see also app. 471 (Shiley document sent to doctors noting an 
investigative article which recommended replacement of heart 
valves in young patients).  Michael understandably took the 
advice of her medical advisors.  The cost, inconvenience, risk, 
and pain of the surgery to explant and replace the valve occurred 
because of Shiley's alleged general manufacturing deficiencies 
  
which led to Shiley's alleged breach of its warranty of 
reasonable care. 
 Contrary to Shiley's arguments, our conclusion does not 
conflict with our recent decision in Angus v. Shiley, Inc., 989 
F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993).11  In Angus, we concluded that a 
recipient of a Shiley valve could not recover for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and a failure to warn claim 
where the implanted valve had neither failed nor been explanted.  
Id. at 147 & n.5.  Angus had failed to allege that the valve 
implanted in Angus was defective.  Id.  In the absence of a valve 
failure or explantation surgery, she could not maintain a product 
liability action.  Id.   In footnote 5, we explicitly held open 
the question of whether relief would be appropriate following 
surgery to explant the valve.  Id. at 147 n.5.   
 Unlike the plaintiff in Angus, Michael has suffered a 
tangible injury on account of the risks, pain, and emotional 
trauma associated with explantation of the Shiley valve.  
Michael's case presents the issue left open in Angus -- what 
relief may be accorded for physical and emotional trauma 
occasioned by the need for actual explantation surgery.  We 
conclude that, under the terms of Shiley's express warranty, 
                     
11
.  Shiley claims we had earlier determined that a plaintiff 
whose valve had not failed could not recover for emotional 
distress on any product liability theory in Brinkman v. Shiley, 
Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 902 F.2d 
1558 (3d Cir. 1989); see Shiley Brief at 41.  We, of course, are 
not bound by an unpublished disposition of our court.  See Third 
Circuit Internal Operating Procedures § 5.8.  Moreover, the 
plaintiff in Brinkman, unlike the plaintiff here, had not 
undergone explantation surgery. 
  
sufficient evidence has been shown by Michael to withstand entry 
of summary judgment for Shiley.  Our conclusion is consistent 
with Pennsylvania's rule that emotional harm may be recovered 
when it accompanies a physical injury.  Houston v. Texaco, Inc., 
538 A.2d 502, 504 (Pa. Super. 1988).   
 
 B. 
 Finally, we consider whether Michael produced sufficient 
evidence to proceed to trial on her fraud claim.12  In 
Pennsylvania, the elements of fraud are: (1) a material 
misrepresentation of fact, (2) which is false and (3) made with 
knowledge of its falsity, (4) which is intended to induce the 
receiver to act, and (5) upon which a party justifiably relies.  
Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate, 951 F.2d 1399, 1409 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 It is well established that fraud consists of anything 
calculated to deceive, whether by single act or 
combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion 
of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or 
by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or 
look or gesture.  We have held that "fraud is composed 
of a misrepresentation fraudulently uttered with the 
intent to induce the action undertaken in reliance upon 
                     
12
.  The somewhat confusing nature of the district court's orders 
makes it uncertain that the district court determined that 
Michael did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on her 
fraud claim.  While the court granted a judgment on her fraud 
claim on the belief that it was pre-empted, a conclusion which we 
now reverse, the court granted Shiley's motion for summary 
judgment for failure to produce sufficient evidence on all claims 
"except plaintiff's fraud claim."  Nonetheless, because we 
exercise the same review as the district court did in the first 
instance, we will consider the merits of Shiley's motion, 
particularly since the two district court orders appear on their 
face to conflict with one another. 
  
it, to the damage of its victim."  The concealment of a 
material fact can amount to a culpable 
misrepresentation no less than does an intentional 
false statement. 
Moser v. DeSetta, 589 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. 1991) (quoting Thomas v. 
Seman, 304 A.2d 134, 137 (Pa. 1973)) (other citations omitted).  
 In support of her claim, Michael points to two sources of 
fraudulent information:  (1) letters written by Shiley to doctors 
between 1978 and 1983 which attempt to minimize the significance 
of the prior valve fractures and (2) advertisements and other 
promotional materials which emphasize a reduction in 
complications with the Shiley valve that never materialized.   
 Michael claims that Shiley's representations to doctors in 
letters, which accompanied its recalls and which Shiley otherwise 
disseminated to boost the Shiley valve's image following the 
disclosure of the outlet strut fractures, misrepresented the 
extent of the strut fracture problem.  These letters state that 
some fractures had occurred but purportedly withheld information 
on the actual number of strut fractures known to Shiley.  
Further, the letters asserted that the Shiley valve's original 
design and the then current manufacturing practices confirm the 
structural integrity of the Shiley valve.    
 In contrast to Shiley's reports, the record discloses that 
Shiley had ample reasons to believe both the heart valve's design 
and the manufacturing process rendered the heart valve unsafe.  
Just a month prior to Shiley's distribution of a set of letters 
to doctors in May 1982, Dr. Bjork, one of the original designers 
of the Shiley valve, wrote Shiley, "You're circling around with 
  
other solutions is probably a waste of time.  At this stage, 
welding will not be acceptable any more [sic]. . . . Your 
statement re. strut fractures that I just received only tells me 
that your manufacturing procedure is not acceptable.  You have 
provided me with absolutely no facts and truthworthy [sic] data 
for the future."  App. 461.   
 In a prior letter to Dr. Bjork, Shiley had written, "We 
would prefer that you did not publish the data relative to strut 
fractures.  We expect a few more and until the problem has been 
corrected, we do not feel comfortable."  App. 548.  This 
disclosure contrasts with Shiley's assurances in the letters to 
doctors that new fractures were very unlikely to occur.   
 Moreover, Michael has produced affidavits and deposition 
testimony from employees who worked for Shiley in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s that state that Shiley supervisors and management 
ordered them to reweld valves which could not pass inspection, to 
polish or cover defects in outlet strut welds, and to rework 
previously scrapped valves in an attempt to hide any defects in 
the outlet strut welds.  App. 555-57, 613-17, 625-29, 635-36.  
These manufacturing practices likely undermined the structural 
integrity of the valves and thereby rendered Shiley's 
representations false. 
 Michael has also produced samples of advertisements, which 
Shiley placed in medical journals that circulate to cardiac 
surgeons, claiming a fifty percent reduction in complications 
with the Shiley valve over prior valves.  App. 678.  In prior 
testimony, Dr. Bjork disagreed that this claim fully represented 
  
the scientific findings.  App. 812.  By 1984, the FDA, through 
independent investigation, concluded that scientific tests could 
not confirm these reductions.  App. 766.  In fact, the FDA 
determined that the Shiley valve's design "d[id] not result in 
meaningful differences in thromboembolic complications in 
clinical experience . . . .  After nearly eight years of clinical 
use, there is no statistically significant difference between 
[the Shiley valve and its predecessor] when thromboembolic 
complication rates are compared."  Id. 
 This record reveals a sufficient pattern of affirmative 
statements that are contrary to the true information known to 
Shiley, which, when combined with the withholding of material 
information as to the integrity and properties of the Shiley 
valve, is more than sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that 
Shiley intentionally misrepresented the Shiley valve's 
performance and the importance of the strut fractures. 
 Having adduced evidence of the first three elements of a 
cause of action sounding in fraud, we turn to a consideration of 
the remaining two elements:  inducement and justifiable reliance.  
We conclude that Shiley had ample reason to expect that its 
advertisements and letters, although directed to physicians, 
would induce action by heart patients to accept Shiley's implants 
on the basis of their physicians' recommendations.  We also 
conclude that the patients' reliance on these recommendations was 
justifiable. 
 Pennsylvania has held that "the persons or class of persons 
whom [a fraudulent declarant] intends or has reason to expect to 
  
act or refrain from action in reliance upon the 
misrepresentation" may sue in fraud for the damage which results 
from the declarant's fraudulent statement.  Woodward v. Dietrich, 
548 A.2d 301, 309, 315 (Pa. Super. 1988) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 531 (1976)).   
 In Woodward, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a 
subsequent transferee of a home could sue the prior owner's 
plumbing contractor, when the plumber had fraudulently 
misrepresented to the prior owner that his work met the relevant 
municipal codes.  The plumber fraudulently concealed an improper 
link to the city's sewer system after being hired by the 
Dietrichs, the former owners of the house, to bring the house up 
to code.  After the Dietrichs sold the home to the Woodwards, the 
sewer line backed up into the house's basement.  The Woodwards 
brought a cause of action sounding in fraud against the plumber. 
 The Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the rule of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 (1976), which reads: 
 One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject 
to liability to the persons or class of persons whom he 
intends or has reason to expect to act or refrain from 
action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for 
pecuniary loss suffered by them through their 
justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in 
which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct 
to be influenced. 
This provision extends liability beyond those to whom the 
declarant directs his fraudulent misrepresentation to those whom 
the declarant has special reason to anticipate will be induced to 
act.  Woodward, 548 F.2d at 313, 315.  As comment "e" of the 
Restatement makes clear, the declarant need not know the identity 
  
of the eventual plaintiff if the plaintiff is a member of a class 
of persons whom the declarant has reason to expect will act in 
reliance upon his fraud.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 
comment e (1976) ("The maker may have reason to expect that his 
misrepresentation will reach any of a class of persons, although 
he does not know the identity of the person whom it will reach or 
indeed of any individual in the class."); Woodward, 548 F.2d at 
309 n.9.   
 After adopting this standard, the court found that the 
plumber had reason to expect that any subsequent purchaser, such 
as the Woodwards, would rely on his fraudulent statement that the 
sewer connection was acceptable, and thus, the court permitted 
the Woodwards to proceed with their fraud action.13 
 The Superior Court's decision mirrors § 533 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Section 533 makes a declarant 
liable when the declarant "has reason to expect that [the 
                     
13
.   More recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court relied 
upon its opinion in Woodward to decide that plaintiffs need not 
have been in privity with a product manufacturer to bring a claim 
under Pennsylvania's consumer fraud statute, the Pennsylvania 
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Con. 
Stat. Ann. § 209-9.2(a).  Valley Forge Towers South Condominium 
v. Ron-IKE Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 646-47 (Pa. 
Super. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 605 A.2d 798 (Pa. 1992).  As 
a result, a condominium association could sue their roofing 
contractor's supplier for the supplier's unlawful business 
practices despite the fact that the association never purchased 
materials from the supplier.  Rather it had only received a 
warranty from the supplier.  "[A]s the materials were intended to 
become part of a fixture to realty, [the supplier] knew or should 
have known that its warranty would be relied upon by [the 
condominium association] covered by the roof it warranted."  Id. 
at 646. 
 
  
misrepresentation's] terms will be repeated or its substance 
communicated to the other, and that [the misrepresentation] will 
influence his conduct in the transaction or type of transaction 
involved."  See Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc., 
794 F.2d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding licensor liable to 
sublicensee for representations made to licensee with reason to 
expect that they would influence sublicensee's behavior).  As 
with § 531, the comments to § 533 make it clear that the 
declarant (here, Shiley) need not be able to identify the party 
(here, Michael) who eventually relies if the party (here, 
Michael) who relies is a member of a class of people that the 
declarant (here, Shiley) would expect to rely on the 
representation.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 comment g 
(1976). 
 Michael fits within the rule of Woodward and Restatement 
§ 533.  Shiley had ample reason to expect that the patients and 
eventual recipients of the Shiley valve implants would be 
affected by the information it published and distributed to 
doctors.  Indeed, that was Shiley's intent.  Shiley had to 
anticipate that its letters and advertisements would lead doctors 
to recommend, and the physician's patients to choose, the Shiley 
valve.  As § 533 makes clear, the fact that Shiley initially made 
its representations to Michael's doctors, rather than directly to 
Michael, does not undermine Michael's claim.   
 By the same token, Michael's doctors were justified in 
relying on the medical claims Shiley provided in its promotional 
materials to determine the proper course of treatment for 
  
Michael.14  Shiley held a tremendous advantage over the doctors 
in its knowledge of the facts surrounding the strut fractures and 
the scientific literature on thromboembolism.  The doctors were 
justified in relying on Shiley to restate honestly the facts and 
findings pertaining to the valves which Shiley produced.  See 
Aaron Ferer & Sons, Ltd v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 
123 (2d Cir. 1984) (where "one party possesses superior 
knowledge, not readily available to the other, and knows that the 
other is acting on the basis of the mistaken information," the 
second party can justifiably rely on the first party's 
representations); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. 
1992) ("[I]f one who has superior knowledge makes a statement 
about the goods sold and does not qualify the statement as his 
opinion, the statement will be treated as a statement of fact."); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 542(a) & comment f (1976).   
 The information provided by Shiley was intended to affect a 
doctor's choice of a heart valve for Michael.  Shiley distributed 
its literature containing heart valve information for that very 
purpose -- to encourage doctors to continue implanting the Shiley 
valve.  The record, read in the light most favorable to Michael, 
                     
14
.  Both her doctors testified that they received letters from 
Shiley regarding the Shiley valve.  App. 495, 524.  While they 
did not retain those letters, it is reasonable to assume, given 
Shiley's nationwide distribution of the letters, that these 
letters include the communications discussed above.  Both doctors 
stated that they read standard cardiac journals in which Shiley's 
advertisements and claims appeared in order to stay current with 
developments in the field of cardiology and cardiac surgery.  
App. 500, 535. 
 
  
suggests that the doctors, who advised Michael, relied on 
Shiley's disclosures.  Accordingly, Shiley's letters and 
promotional materials likely affected the choice to implant the 
Shiley valve in Michael. 
 We conclude that Michael has produced sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of fact on her claim of fraud and we will 
reverse the district court's February 25, 1994 orders of summary 
judgment on that claim. 
 
  
 VII 
 Having considered the record and the arguments of the 
parties, we will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on Michael's claims of negligence (both manufacturing 
and design), strict product liability, and breach of implied 
warranties -- all of which we hold are pre-empted by 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360k.  (See section IV. A. supra).  We also hold that Michael's 
complaint to the extent it relies on fraud perpetrated by Shiley 
on the FDA is pre-empted.  (See section V. A. supra).   
 We will reverse the district court's February 25, 1994 order 
granting summary judgment to Shiley on Michael's breach of 
express warranty claim (see section IV. B. & VI. A. supra) and 
her fraud claim insofar as she proceeds on the basis of Shiley's 
representations in its advertising and promotional materials.  
(See section V. B. & VI. B. supra).   
 We will remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. 
 
 
     
